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ABSTRACT
This literature review seeks to portray the scholarship on the
feminist critique and women’s activism vis-à-vis religion-based
family law in India. The key question is: Which aspects of the
Indian family law system are problematic from a women’s rights
perspective and how can these aspects be addressed and
reformed? The scholarship on this topic stems from three broad
strands of literature: The first looks at family law and jurisprudence
from a feminist perspective. It points to discriminatory aspects and
suggests particular measures for reform. The second strand com-
prises studies of legal anthropologists on how women “on the
ground” manoeuvre through the intricacies of state law, religious
and cultural norms and claims for gender justice. It acknowledges
that the Indian State practically shares its authority over law-mak-
ing and adjudication with various other stakeholders. The third
strand of literature is situated in the area of gender studies and
deals with the Indian women’s movement’s activism vis-à-vis the
personal laws.
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Introduction
The Indian Supreme Court’s judgement in Shayara Bano,1 wherein the Court declared
the Muslim form of divorce by triple talaq invalid, and the current debates about a Talaq
Bill once again demonstrate the actuality of the discourse around personal laws. The case
was initiated by five Muslim women and their petitions were supported by a number of
Muslim women’s rights organizations. A variety of questions featured in the hearings,
judgement and the media discourse around the case: Can religion-based personal laws be
tested against the fundamental right to equality (Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian
Constitution)? Is triple talaq protected under Article 25 as an essential practice of
Islam? And can the Supreme Court interfere in the matter, or do either the religious
communities or the Indian legislature have the authority to amend the personal law
system? Not all of these questions were fully and satisfactorily answered by the Court.
Thus, even after this landmark judgement, it would appear that key questions remain
unanswered in the area of personal laws, making it a contested terrain where not only is
CONTACT Tanja Herklotz, LLM (SOAS) tanja.herklotz@rewi.hu-berlin.de Chair for Public and Comparative Law,
Humboldt University Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany
1Shayara Bano v Union of India and Others AIR 2017 SC 4609.
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religious freedom played out against gender equality, but these aspects are also inter-
twined with arguments around identity, nationalism, modernity and secularism.
This literature review seeks to evaluate the scholarship that engages with the Indian
personal law system through a gender lens. According to this system, certain family and
property matters (marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship, adoption, succession
and inheritance) of Hindus, Muslims, Parsis and Christians as well as Jews are governed
by their respective religious laws.2 Notwithstanding the debates about a replacement of
this system with a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) which date back to pre-Independence
times,3 to date, the personal laws have been maintained and the Constitution’s directive
principle to “endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code” (Article 44)
remains unfulfilled. Using Gopika Solanki’s terminology, this plurilegal system of family
law could be described as one of “shared adjudication”: the State enjoys only restrained
autonomy in this area and willingly splits its adjudicative authority with religious and
societal actors and organizations.4
The key question that lies at the centre of this review is the following: Which aspects
of the personal law system are problematic from a women’s rights perspective and how
can these problematic aspects be addressed and reformed?
The literature that this overview engages with derives from three broad fields of
research. The first strand of literature stems from feminist legal studies and looks at
family law and jurisprudence from a feminist or gendered perspective. It deals with
those norms among the personal law system that are discriminatory from a women’s
rights perspective as well as with the shortcomings in the application of personal laws
by the judiciary and the executive. An engagement with this scholarship reveals that
when positioning themselves on the issue of personal laws, many feminist scholars find
themselves facing a conundrum. On the one hand, the fact that personal laws often
discriminate against women has led them to criticize these laws as patriarchal and in
need of reform. On the other hand, they do not necessarily regard the centralization,
secularization and unification of the law as a panacea but also seek to accommodate
cultural and religious identity. Broader debates on Third World Feminism,5
intersectionality,6 legal universality and cultural relativism play a central role here.
The second strand of literature comprises studies of legal anthropologists on how
women “on the ground” manoeuvre through the intricacies of state law, religion-based
personal law, sociocultural norms and claims for gender justice. This literature deals
with the fact that India is a country where the state “never had and most probably never
will have a legal monopoly in the area of family laws”,7 but where its “fractured” and
2Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs are counted in the Hindu-category: see for instance, Hindu Marriage Act 1955, s 2(1)(b).
3Granville Austin, ‘Religion, Personal Law, and Identity in India’ in Gerald James Larson (ed), Religion and Personal Law in
Secular India: A Call to Judgment (Indiana University Press 2001).
4Gopika Solanki, Adjudication in Religious Family Laws: Cultural Accommodation, Legal Pluralism, and Gender Equality in
India (Cambridge University Press 2011).
5The terminology refers to Mohanty’s understanding of Third World women as an “imagined community”. Chandra
Talpade Mohanty, ‘Introduction: Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism’ in
Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres (eds), Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism
(Indiana University Press 1991) 4.
6Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] The University of Chicago Legal Forum 139.
7Mengia Hong Tschalaer, Muslim Women’s Quest for Justice: Gender, Law and Activism in India (Cambridge University
Press 2017) 52.
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“partial” sovereignty8 allows societal institutions to claim authority over adjudication
and lawmaking. Scholars in this field apply the concepts of legal pluralism,9
interlegality10 and vernacularization11 to the context of personal laws in India to
describe the coexistence of legal systems as well as the large “variety of formal and
informal, rural and urban, large and intimate” dispute resolution fora.12 Drawing on
insights gathered during fieldwork in different parts of the country, such as court
observations or interviews with women’s rights activists and litigants, the authors depict
the advantages and disadvantages of India’s plurilegal landscape.
The third strand of literature deals with the Indian women’s movement’s activism
vis-à-vis the personal laws. This scholarship is largely situated in the area of women’s
and gender studies and ranges from early seminal works on the Indian women’s
movement13 to more recent engagements with Islamic feminist activism. The field of
women’s and gender studies emerged in India in the late 1970s – parallel to the
emergence of the Indian women’s movement. In fact, it is sometimes hard to
distinguish scholarship on the women’s movement from the movement itself, as in
many cases scholars were also active participants of the movement and women’s
studies centres have even been described as “[t]he other arm of the women’s move-
ment”, complementing women’s activism “on the ground”.14 This overlap between
research and activism has led to the creation of new knowledge and innovative
methodologies in the area of women’s and gender studies.15 Scholarship in this area
highlights how campaigning, awareness raising and approaching the parliament and
courts can lead – and has led – to legal (and social) reforms vis-à-vis the personal
laws. This literature has much in common with studies that assess the impact of the
Global South’s women’s movements on the law – often against resistance from
religious communities.16 A key paradox in women’s rights activism, that Gandhi
and Shah formulated in 1992 and which is still of relevance today is the fact that on
the one hand, “every campaign in the movement has demanded legal reform”, while
on the other hand, the movement has severely criticized “the legal system, the
8Shalini Randeria, ‘Entangled Histories of Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in
Post-Colonial India’ in Yehuda Elkana and others (eds), Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of
Connectedness (Campus 2002) 308.
9John Griffiths, ‘What Is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1.
10Boaventura De Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Postmodern Concept of Law’ (1987) 14 Journal of
Law and Society 279.
11Sally Engle Merry and Peggy Levitt, ‘Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru,
China, India and the United States’ (2009) 9 Global Networks 441. The authors define vernacularization as “the
process of appropriation and local adoption of globally generated ideas and strategies”.
12Srimati Basu, The Trouble with Marriage: Feminists Confront Law and Violence in India (University of California Press
2015) 97.
13The key examples here are Nandita Gandhi and Nandita Shah, The Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Women’s
Movement in India (Kali for Women 1992); Radha Kumar, The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for
Women’s Rights and Feminism in India 1800–1990 (Kali for Women 1993). In both works, campaigns with regard to the
personal laws feature among other aspects of women’s rights activism. Gandhi and Shah point out that “[t]he subject
of family or personal laws is probably one of the most complex and sensitive issues in today’s political climate”:
Gandhi and Shah (n 13) 229.
14Neera Desai, Feminism as Experience: Thoughts and Narratives (Sparrow 2006) 68.
15Ibid 69.
16On the legal activism of women’s movements in North Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, see Mulki Al-
Sharmani (ed), Feminist Activism, Women’s Rights and Legal Reform (Zed Books 2013). On the Moroccan women’s
movement, see Amy Young Evrard, The Moroccan Women’s Rights Movement (Syracuse University Press 2014).
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hopelessness of achieving legal redress, and the endless squabbles with law makers
and implementors”.17
As this brief overview indicates, this scholarship deals with the personal law system
on two different levels: Firstly, it directly engages with the personal laws and those
(formal and informal) institutions that interpret, apply and shape these laws (the first
and the second strand of literature). Secondly, it indirectly engages with personal laws,
when it portrays the Indian women’s movement and individual activists who have
sought to reform these laws (the third and to some extent the second strand of
literature).
In dealing with the personal laws, the three fields of literature necessarily address
different actors that shape the discourse around this topic: “the state” (the legisla-
ture, the executive and the judiciary), religious communities, the media and civil
society. These actors feature not only in the scholarship’s engagement with the
challenges of the personal law system (elaborated in the section on “Contestations
around the personal law system: where do the problems lie?”). Here “the state” is
critiqued as patriarchal, malfunctioning and avoiding confrontation with the reli-
gious communities, and the religious institutions are seen as equally patriarchal and
biased against women. The different actors also play a role in the scholarship’s
engagement with potential remedies to the ills of the system (elaborated in the
“Curing the ills: reform suggestions and women’s rights activism” section). Here the
authors point to the responsibilities of the parliament, the courts, the religious
communities and civil society, especially women’s rights groups.
A final point that this introduction should mention is that although the personal
laws of all religious communities are regarded as problematic from a gendered point of
view, both in the general discourse as well as in academic scholarship, Muslim personal
law plays a special role. In the popular debate, the personal laws of India’s largest
minority community (constituting 14.2% of the population) often function as a crucible
in which larger conflicts between Hindus and Muslims are played out. While for many
Muslims, their personal laws are a crucial marker of minority identity, for some Hindu
nationalists, the laws are an example of Muslims being granted a special status in society
in which they unjustifiably enjoy more rights than other communities. Scholarship has
critically dealt with Muslim personal law provisions, while at the same time attempting
to disrupt stereotypes and wrong understandings about Muslim personal law. It has
depicted Muslim women’s rights activism and the everyday life of Muslim women
under personal laws by speaking with the women concerned rather than speaking only
about them.
Contestations around the personal law system: where do the problems lie?
That personal laws are problematic from a gendered point of view is not news to many
readers. However, it is important to notice that although the gender aspect of the personal
laws features prominently today, this was not always the case. The feminist critique of the
personal laws was for a long time a minority perspective. However, due to the continuous
feminist critique of the “mainstream” scholarship on the personal laws, the gendered
17Gandhi and Shah (n 13) 267.
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dimension has gained a foothold in the discourse. “Mainstream” literature on the
personal laws, such as handbooks and student literature on family law or specific studies
on the legal systems of the different communities, tended to restrict itself to a normative
engagement with the provisions of the different personal law systems and case law
emanating from the Indian higher judiciary. Popular debate, when engaging critically
with the personal law system, largely focused on issues of secularism, national identity
and modernity. The large amount of scholarship that exists on the issue has put the
personal law system into its historical context and depicted its shaping during the colonial
period and its developments since then.18 In particular, it has addressed the aspect of
secularism and religious identity19 or compared the Indian personal law system with the
legal systems in other countries,20 for instance in order to suggest guidelines for the
process of preparing and implementing a UCC.21 While the aspect of gender equality
features in some of these works, it tends to play a subordinate role.
This “gender blind spot” has been criticized by feminist scholars. Nivedita Menon
very pointedly states,
[T]here always circulates in the public domain some version of the argument that, to be truly
secular, India needs a UCC. But the question we must ask is, to what extent is the issue of the
Uniform Civil Code about “secularism”? Is it about the relationship between religious com-
munities and the state? Is it not really about gender-injustice – that is, the constitutionally
enshrined inequality between men and women?… The fact is that all personal laws on
marriage, and inheritance and guardianship of children, discriminate against women in
some form or the other; surely, this should make the issue of the Uniform Civil Code visible
in a differentway? Should it not be debated as “India cannot claim to be truly gender-just as long
as discriminatory personal laws exist”?However, only feminists pose the question in this way.22
Other than making the gender dimension prominent, feminist scholars have also
stressed that indeed all personal laws contain aspects that discriminate against
women. They thereby sought to disrupt the common notion that it was only Muslim
personal law that was problematic from a gendered point of view. Agnes, for instance,
stresses that her aim was to disrupt the notion that pits “progressive” Hindu law against
“regressive-fundamentalist” Muslim law – an understanding that emerged after the
reform of Hindu personal law in the 1950s.23
The feminist critique of personal laws is part of a broader set of scholarship that deals
with legal norms from a critical feminist perspective or that engages critically with Indian
18Rina Verma Williams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legacies and the Indian State (Oxford University
Press 2006); Parta S Ghosh, The Politics of Personal Law in South Asia: Identity, Nationalism and the Uniform Civil Code
(Routledge 2007); Nandini Chatterjee, ‘Religious Change, Social Conflict and Legal Competition: The Emergence of
Christian Personal Law in Colonial India’ (2010) 44 Modern Asian Studies 1147; Narendra Subramanian, Nation and
Family. Personal Law, Cultural Pluralism, and Gendered Citizenship (Standford University Press 2014).
19Gerald James Larson (ed), Religion and Personal Law in Secular India: A Call to Judgment (Indiana University Press 2001).
20Ghosh (n 18); Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, Muslim Family Law, Secular Courts and Muslim Women of South Asia: A
Study in Judicial Activism (Oxford University Press 2011); Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, Cases on Muslim Law of
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Oxford University Press 2015); Subramanian (n 18); Shimon Shetreet and Hiram E
Chodosh, Uniform Civil Code for India: Proposed Blueprint for Scholarly Discourse (Oxford University Press 2015).
21Shetreet and Chodosh (n 20).
22Nivedita Menon, Seeing Like a Feminist (Penguin 2012) 151.
23Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume I: Family Laws and Constitutional Claims (Oxford University Press 2011) 21. See also
Williams (n 18) 15; Vrinda Narain, Reclaiming the Nation: Muslim Women and the Law in India (University of Toronto
Press 2008) 138–39; Menon (n 22) 26. On the problematic depiction of Muslim personal law by the Indian media, see
Nadja-Christina Schneider, Zur Darstellung von “Kultur” und “kultureller Differenz” im indischen Mediensystem: die
indische Presse und die Repräsentation des Islams im Rahmen der Zivilrechtsdebatte, 1985–87 und 2003 (Logos 2005).
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women’s situation in the broader sociolegal conditions under which they live.24 Scholars
who have combined an in-depth legal analysis of the personal laws with a feminist
critique include, among others, Flavia Agnes, Farrah Ahmed, Indira Jaising, Ratna
Kapur, Catherine A MacKinnon, Vrinda Narain, Archana Parashar and Rajeswari
Sunder Rajan. Agnes and Jaising could both be described as “scholactivists” – scholars
whose work is enriched with very valuable first-hand experiences from their work as
practising lawyers and women’s rights activists. In addition to feminist legal scholarship,
legal anthropologists, such as Srimati Basu, Livia Holden, Gopika Solanki, Mengia Hong
Tschalaer, or Sylvia Vatuk, have described in detail where either state institutions such as
the family courts or religious dispute settlement fora such as darul qazas or other
informal institutions create hurdles (but sometimes also opportunities) for gender equal-
ity. The critique that these scholars provide takes into account various actors. This section
is thus structured along the lines of the aspects, actors or institutions that the scholars
find fault with: the personal laws as such, the higher and the lower judiciary, the religious
clergy as well as religious non-state dispute settlement fora.
The personal laws
The critique of the personal laws is linked to some degree to their heritage. Thus, much
scholarship first contextualizes the laws historically. Authors point out that while on the
one hand the British colonizers exempted parts of religious law from the purview of
their regulatory action,25 at the same time the colonial system largely shaped the
content of the personal laws as the British interfered with these laws through legislation
as well as through judges’ interpretation.26 In fact, as Williams points out, more than 20
legislative Acts were passed between 1865 and 1939 that affected the personal laws in
some form.27 In addition, scholars have convincingly argued that the colonial jurispru-
dence led to a “Brahmanization” of Hindu personal law and an “Islamization” of
Muslim personal law as well as a general rigidification of the personal laws as such.28
At the same time, British concepts have found their way into the interpretation of
24In feminist literature, the personal laws thus often feature as one among many aspects, including the situation of
rural, tribal or Dalit women, women’s economic rights and work participation, women’s right to health, women’s
sexuality, sex work, domestic violence and custodial rape. Publications that address the personal laws in such broader
context include the following: Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Scandal of the State: Women, Law and Citizenship in
Postcolonial India (Duke University Press 2003); Geetanjali Gangoli, Indian Feminisms: Law, Patriarchies and Violence in
India (Ashgate 2007); Neera Bharihoke (ed), Rights of Hindu and Muslim Women (Serials 2008); Archana Parashar and
Amita Dhanda (eds), Redefining Family Law in India: Essays in Honour of B. Sivaramayya (Routledge 2008). Kirti Singh
has tackled the socio-economic components of the family laws and the gap between the law and the lived reality:
Kirti Singh, Separated and Divorced Women in India: Economic Rights and Entitlements (Sage 2013).
25Most prominently, the Warren Hastings Plan of 1772 provided that Hindus and Muslims were to be governed by their
own laws in disputes relating to inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious usages and institutions.
26See for instance Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India: Uniform Civil Code and Gender Equality
(Sage Publications 1992); Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press 2003);
Siobhan Mullally, ‘Feminism and Multicultural Dilemmas in India: Revisiting the Shah Bano Case’ (2004) 24 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 671; Rina Verma Williams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legacies and the
Indian State (Oxford University Press 2006); Rochana Bajpai, Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in
India (Oxford University Press 2011).
27Williams (n 26) 73.
28Agnes, Family Law Volume I (n 23) 5; Janaki Nair, ‘The Foundations of Modern Legal Structures in India’ in Raka Ray
(ed), Handbook of Gender (Oxford University Press 2012); Serajuddin, Muslim Family Law (n 20) 29.
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personal laws, so that the laws as in place today have been described as a “curious
amalgam of religious rules and English legal concepts”.29
An extensive overview of the Indian family law from a feminist perspective and in
depth critical analyses of the problematic aspects of different personal laws is provided
by Flavia Agnes,30 Laura Dudley Jenkins31 or Archana Parashar.32 They address in
detail the different norms related to marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance,
adoption and guardianship and make an effort to distinguish the many different rules
and exceptions. They do not stop at criticizing triple talaq or polygamy among
Muslims, but address the problematic features among Hindu, Christian or Parsi law,
leading them to the conclusion that “[a]ll religious personal laws manage to treat
women less favourably than men”.33 Flavia Agnes’ two volumes on Family Law are
worth special mention here as the author’s feminist viewpoint on the topic is definitely
what makes her books stand out from regular textbooks on family law. Agnes seeks to
challenge “the traditional notion that law is a neutral, objective, rational set of rules,
unaffected in content and form by the passions and perspectives of those who possess
and wield the power inherent in law and legal institutions”.34 She understands law as
being “determined by the actual practices of courts, law offices, and political stations,
rather than as rules and doctrines set forth in statutes or learned treatises”.35
The higher judiciary
Scholars do not only see problems with the laws themselves but also argue that the system
that maintains the personal laws suffers from shortcomings. It is particularly the Indian
higher judiciary that has come under the critique of feminist legal scholars in this regard.
For instance, Catherine A MacKinnon points out that while India’s jurisprudence
has in some areas been quite progressive with regard to women’s rights, this has not
been the case in the area of personal laws.36 Even when the judges decide in a manner
that is ultimately favourable for the women concerned (in cases such as Shah Bano37 or
Danial Latifi38), the courts usually do not ground their decision on sex equality. A
similar argument is made by Indira Jaising.39 She argues that the Indian courts have
avoided an in-depth analysis with regard to the personal laws and have circumvented
the question of discrimination in family laws, either by holding that the personal laws
29Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform (n 26) 307.
30Agnes, Family Law Volume I (n 23); Flavia Agnes, Family Law Volume II: Marriage, Divorce, and Matrimonial Litigation
(Oxford University Press 2011).
31Laura Dudley Jenkins, ‘Diversity and the Constitution in India: What is Religious Freedom?’ (2009) 57 Drake Law
Review 913.
32Archana Parashar, ‘Just Family Law: Basic to all Indian Women’ in Indira Jaising (ed), Men’s Laws, Women’s Lives: A
Constitutional Perspective on Religion, Common Law and Culture in South Asia (Women Unlimited 2005).
33Ibid 286.
34Agnes, Family Law Volume I (n 23) xxvi.
35Ibid xxii.
36Catharine A MacKinnon, ‘Sex Equality under the Constitution of India: Problems, Prospects and “Personal Laws”’
(2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 181.
37Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum and Ors AIR 1985 SC 945.
38Danial Latifi & Anr v Union of India AIR 2001 SC 3958.
39Indira Jaising, ‘From “Colonial” to “Constitutional”, Gender Justice and Governance’ in Indira Jaising (ed), Men’s Laws,
Women’s Lives: A Constitutional Perspective on Religion, Common Law and Culture in South Asia (Women Unlimited
2005); Indira Jaising, ‘Gender Justice: A Constitutional Perspective’ in Indira Jaising (ed), Men’s Laws, Women’s Lives: A
Constitutional Perspective on Religion, Common Law and Culture in South Asia (Women Unlimited 2005).
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are not “laws” under the purview of Article 13, by drawing on the argument of a
separation of powers and passing the ball back to the legislator, or by arguing that a
specific discrimination was not based “only on the grounds of sex” as demanded by
Article 15(1).40 Even in cases where the women claimants “won”, the Court refused to
test the specific personal law provisions against the doctrine of equality. For instance, in
Mary Roy,41 the problematic provision in the Trivancore Christian Succession Act was
struck down on a technical device.42 In Madhu Kishwar & Ors v State of Bihar43 and in
Githa Hariharan,44 the Court “read down” the discriminatory provisions, rather than
declaring them unconstitutional.45 In a similar manner Agnes’ analysis of a vast number
of decisions of the Indian higher judiciary exposes sexist and paternalistic remarks.46
MacKinnon mentions a number of potential explanations for the courts’ reluctance to
engage with the constitutionality of the personal laws. One reason might be a concern that
invalidating existing laws “would bring about a chaos in the existing state of law”.47
Additionally, sex equality might be regarded as a Western and hegemonic idea that does
not respect cultural diversity.48 Lastly, across cultures the family is an area where “we
encounter a pervasive and categorical reluctance to recognize sex equality rights”.49 Overall,
MacKinnon states, “In cases challenging sex inequality in personal laws, Indian courts
appear paralyzed by the fear of being tarred by the brush of cultural insensitivity”.50
The lower judiciary
While feminist scholars criticize the Indian higher judiciary for not demonstrating
enough courage to interfere with the personal laws, the critique of the lower judiciary
is a different one: it concerns both the procedural law as well as the (mal)functioning of
the lower courts, particularly the family courts and the patriarchal and paternalistic
attitudes that are present within these institutions.
Established by the Family Courts Act of 1984 as an outcome of the work of the Indian
women’s movement, the objective of the family courts was that they should be easily
accessible and that litigants could express their concerns to judges in “plain language”, as
Basu describes.51 In these courts, lawyers only appear as amicus curiae (“friend of the
court”), while counsellors (paralegals or social workers) advise on legal issues and help
clients negotiate settlements. The family court is therefore often depicted “in deliberate
contrast to the impersonality of other courts, suggesting that informality equals greater
comfort”.52 This reform attempt was seen as a positive step by feminist scholars and a
40Jaising, ‘From “Colonial” to “Constitutional”’ (n 39) 331.
41Mrs Mary Roy & Ors v State of Kerala & Ors AIR 1986 SC 1011.
42Jaising, ‘Gender Justice’ (n 39) 6.
43Madhu Kishwar & Ors v State of Bihar & Ors AIR 1996 SC 1864.
44Ms Githa Hariharan & Anr v Reserve Bank of India & Anr AIR 1999 SC 1149.
45Jaising, ‘Gender Justice’ (n 39) 7.
46Agnes, Family Law Volume I (n 23).
47MacKinnon (n 36) 193. The author refers to the Madhu Kishwar case (n 43) here, where the court stated: “We would
rather … refrain from striking down the provisions as such on the touchstone of Article 14 as this would bring about
a chaos in the existing state of law”.
48MacKinnon (n 36) 193.
49Ibid 195.
50Ibid 199.
51Basu (n 12) 96.
52Ibid 104.
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way to tackle “the hostile and intimidating atmosphere within courts, endless delays, strict
technicalities and the sexist-and anti-women interpretation of laws by judges”.53 But not
long after the establishment of the first family courts, disillusionment set in. As Agnes
stresses, the courts turned out to instead preserve the institution of marriage at the
expense of women than to provide for gender equality.54
This assessment is supported by a number of legal anthropologists’ studies on family
courts in different parts of the country. Basu’s study of the Kolkata Family Court, for
instance, depicts how counsellors and judges often see the law as “tedious, pointless, and
indeed harmful” and argue for mediation and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution.55 This attempt to find a compromise rather than settling a case through a
judgement often means that counsellors and judges push couples seeking a divorce to
reconcile. Basu makes out a dominant theme that a couple’s reunion is seen as the
optimal outcome of a dispute, not only for any child’s well-being but also for the woman,
who might have “greater mobility or independence … within the patched-up marriage”
than she would have after divorce.56 This “cultural understanding that marriage protects
women … economically, sexually, and socially” can lead to cases where women are sent
back into violent relationships to secure their economic interests.57
Similar accounts can be found in Vatuk’s study on family courts in Chennai and
Hyderabad58 and Tschalaer’s study on the family court in Lucknow.59 Vatuk states that
the same paternalistic views that dominate in the Muslim clergy are to be found in the
family courts, too:
[T]hose who administer the law also believe that the proper place for an adult woman is
within a marital relationship and that she should do everything in her power, no matter
what the cost, to ensure that she remains there. They too are inclined to consider it
preferable for her to remain under the conjugal roof, whatever the quality of that relation-
ship rather than return to her natal home or, even worse strike out on her own. This view
is premised on the notion that a woman is, by definition, a dependant creature.60
In a similar fashion, Tschaler holds that the family court in Lucknow is far from value
free. Her analysis of the court’s rulings shows that “Muslim women were most likely to
obtain a judgement in their favour if they could successfully reiterate their subjectivity
as a ‘good wife,’ ‘good mother’ and ‘good daughter-in-law’”.61
Religious clergy and non-state justice systems
Lastly, it is also the religious communities, especially the male dominated religious
clergies that are made responsible for boycotting any change to the status quo of their
respective personal laws. The oppression of women by religious communities through
53Flavia Agnes, ‘Family Courts: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’ (1990) The Lawyers 4, reprinted in Mary E John (ed),
Women’s Studies in India: A Reader (Penguin Books 2008).
54Ibid.
55Basu (n 12) 92.
56Ibid 103.
57Ibid 216.
58Sylvia Vatuk, ‘Moving the Courts: Muslim Women and Personal Law’ in Zoya Hasan and Ritu Menon (eds), The Diversity
of Muslim Women’s Lives in India (Rutgers University Press 2005).
59Tschalaer (n 7).
60Vatuk, ‘Moving the Courts’ (n 58) 47.
61Tschalaer (n 7) 150.
258 T. HERKLOTZ
personal laws is illustrated, in the truest sense of the word, in Laxmi and Dasgupta’s
book Our Pictures, Our Words.62 This is a selection of posters that emerged during the
activism of the contemporary women’s movement. The book draws on material that the
publishing house Zubaan gathered through a project called “Poster Women”. In its
section on “communal politics”, it reproduces pictures that show women chained to,
strangled by or silenced by religion or burdened by the holy books that they carry on
their backs. The power that these pictures have is impressive and demonstrates the key
role that this topic played in the movement’s agitation.
A feminist critique of Muslim personal law is provided by Vrinda Narain in
Reclaiming the Nation.63 She argues that the gender bias in Muslim personal law has
persisted largely because the leadership of the Muslim community demands that
women give primacy to their religious affiliation to the detriment of their gender
identity and the state has lacked the political will to confront that leadership directly.
In Narain’s view,
[t]he state has accepted the equation of personal law with group identity and has not
questioned this definition of group accommodation or of group interest. By allowing
Muslim leaders to continue to exercise authority over women of the community by
refusing to reform the personal law, together with the state’s policy of reinforcing the
public/private split by claiming that no change is possible in the personal law unless the
call for change comes from the community itself, the state has abandoned Muslim women
to patriarchal interpretations of personal law and has legitimized their continued
subordination.64
Critique is also brought forward with regard to the so-called Shariat courts or
darul qazas (dispute resolution fora whose decisions are based on Islamic law).
Tschalaer, for instance, observes that in the darul qaza, “only obedient, moral,
battered, and materially neglected women are deemed worthy of the qazi’s
support”.65 Vatuk shows that while it might not be surprising that Muslim clerics
hold paternalistic views, what surprises even more, is that these clerics have a
perception of themselves as being “extremely sympathetic to and solicitous of the
welfare of women.… They sincerely believe, as do other devout Muslims, that their
religion is exceptional and superior to other faiths to the degree that it accords
women respect and care”.66
Curing the ills: reform suggestions and women’s rights activism
Having pointed out the different challenges, a second step would be to think about
potential reforms or ways on how to deal with the aforementioned problems. Much of
the mentioned scholarship is not merely limited to a critique of the personal law system
but also makes suggestions on what needs to be done in order to tackle the short-
comings. In doing so, the literature again addresses the different actors involved: the
state, the religious communities and civil society.
62Laxmi Murthy and Rajashri Dasgupta, Our Pictures, our Words: A Visual Journey through the Women’s Movement
(Zubaan 2011).
63Narain (n 23).
64Ibid 90.
65Tschalaer (n 7) 158.
66Vatuk, ‘Moving the Courts’ (n 58) 46.
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Indeed, the fact that feminist and gendered engagements with the personal law
system come from very different angles and focus on different aspects, logically
means that there is not one “feminist” viewpoint on the issue, but rather a large variety
of positions. While there is a general agreement on a need for reform, the suggestions
on how to go about it, are manifold. In the words of Rajeswari Sunder Rajan:
The only unanimous feminist perception in the matter of the UCC is that all religions’
personal laws are at present gender-discriminatory. To some extent all women’s groups
also agree that therefore these laws must change and that women must be involved in
bringing about these changes. Beyond this, major disagreements divide feminist thinking
on the subject.67
Demanding law reforms: top-down or bottom-up?
There is one strand of scholarship which suggests law reform as a first measure to fix the
system. However, even “law reform” is a wide term that can imply different meanings.
Among the manifold feminist suggestions on what such a law reform should look like, two
extremes can be distinguished: the call for a UCC and the call for small-scale, community-
led legal reforms. Those in favour of a UCC argue that the personal laws violate the equality
provisions in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.68 They also draw on the directive
principle in Article 44,69 and stress that as long as India maintains different personal laws it
cannot fulfil the preamble’s promise of secularism.70 Scholars further cite the provisions of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.71
For instance, Archana Parashar suggests the introduction of a uniform non-
discriminatory law for all Indian women, which would also provide for adequate eco-
nomic rights for them (maintenance, inheritance, an equal share of matrimonial property
and economic independence for women after separation or divorce).72 Parashar’s line of
reasoning repudiates two objections: firstly, that personal laws are somewhat sacrosanct
and unamendable, and secondly that personal laws should be recognized as a fact in a
plurilegal system. Without undermining the importance of religion in a society, she
distinguishes religion-based personal laws from religion itself. As history has illustrated,
67Sunder Rajan (n 24) 157.
68Vasudha Dhagamwar, Towards the Uniform Civil Code (Tripathi 1989); MacKinnon (n 36); Parashar, ‘Just Family Law’ (n
32); Poonam Pradhan Saxena, ‘Succession Laws and Gender justice’ in Archana Parashar and Amita Dhanda (eds),
Redefining Family Law in India: Essays in Honour of B Sivaramayya (Routledge 2008); Narain (n 23) 82. Whether or not
the personal laws can be tested against the equality provisions is debated. The Mumbai High Court in The State of
Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84 held that (uncodified) personal laws were not “laws in force” within the
purview of Article 13 of the Constitution and were therefore not void even when they came into conflict with
fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held a different view in an obiter dictum in C Masilamani Mudaliar & Ors v The
Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil AIR 1996 SC 1697 and also tested the personal laws in a number of cases, most
recently in Shayara Bano (n 1).
69MacKinnon (n 36). As Narain (n 23) 84, points out, Article 44 has, indeed, “been used both to argue that the
constitution makers intended to phase out personal law and introduce a UCC, as well as to argue the opposite, that
Article 44 by its very presence indicates that personal law was to be continued”.
70Indira Jaising, ‘Introduction’ in Indira Jaising (ed), Elusive Equality: Constitutional Guarantees and Legal Regimes in
South Asia, Malaysia and China (Women Unlimited 2011) 9.
71Ibid. It is worthwhile to note here that while India signed and ratified CEDAW in 1980 and 1993 respectively, it made
reservations to specific provisions. Most importantly, with regard to Articles 5 (a) and 16 (1) of CEDAW, wherein the
Indian Government declared that it ensures “these provisions in conformity with its policy of non-interference in the
personal affairs of any Community without its initiative and consent”.
72Parashar, ‘Just Family Law’ (n 32) 310ff.
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she argues, personal laws are human-made constructs and are certainly not “immune” to
change.73 In her opinion, the various religion-based customs and social practices should
not even be termed “law”. Rather, the “fact that people organize their lives by reference to
various systems of rules” does not mean that such systems are legal systems.74 Labelling
these practices “law” would achieve an “implied immunity” from questioning them and
may thereby legitimize gender discriminatory regimes.75
One suggestion is an optional Code, according to which “a sex-equal family law
would be available to all religious communities at the initiative and with the consent of
the women of those communities”.76 Others suggest a hybrid system that combines the
enactment of a UCC with a well-regulated state-recognized regime of religious alter-
native dispute resolution to accommodate both women’s rights and religious
identities.77 MacKinnon, for instance, suggests the enactment of “a uniform code of
family law pursuant to Directive Principle 44 that provides for sex equality in all
respects” but that is “optional at a woman’s discretion”.78 This way, she argues, “[s]ex
equality would not be imposed on anyone”, because women who wanted to be governed
by the personal laws of their communities would be and those who wanted to choose
sex equality could.79 But MacKinnon also acknowledges that “[t]he downside of the
proposal is, obviously, that the burden of claiming and exercising the rights is on
women individually; the social coercion and community costs would be hers to bear”.80
Critique of such an optional code is brought forward by Indira Jaising who argues that
an optional code alone would not suffice: “if the choice is to be meaningful at all, it must be
between gender-just secular law and personal laws that comply with the requirements of
equality. Unequal laws ought not be enforced by the State”.81 She finds it more useful to
applyMarthaNussbaum’s theory of “capabilities”82 in the context of personal laws in India.
“To stand the scrutiny of constitutionality, personal laws must pass a double test: that they
do not violate fundamental entitlements; and that there are exit options into secular
spaces”.83 This test would provide “judicially manageable standards within which state
action can be judged” and would thereby “remove the alibi of the courts that matters of
religion and culture are not within their remit”.84
The contrary approach on the other side of the spectrum of options is the call for
community led law reforms. This approach accepts legal pluralism as a fact and acknowl-
edges the intersection of gender and religion. In Agnes’ view, “small and significant reforms
within the personal laws governing minority communities have greater relevance to
73Ibid 293.
74Archana Parashar, ‘Religious Personal Laws as Non-State Laws: Implications for Gender Justice’ (2013) 45 The Journal
of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 5, 13.
75Ibid 17.
76MacKinnon (n 36) 201. To a certain degree, such an optional code is already in place with the Special Marriage Act
1954 (SMA 1954). Here a further enlargement of the scope of the SMA 1954 has been suggested. A model for such an
optional code was drafted by the Forum Against the Oppression of Women in the 1990s, see Nivedita Menon, ‘Women
and Citizenship’ in Partha Chatterjee (ed), Wages of Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State (Oxford University
Press 1998) 258.
77Farrah Ahmed, ‘Remedying Personal Law Systems’ (2016) 30 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 248.
78MacKinnon (n 36) 199.
79Ibid 200.
80Ibid 202.
81Jaising, ‘Gender Justice’ (n 39) 16.
82Martha C Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge University Press 2000).
83Jaising, ‘Gender Justice’ (n 39) 16.
84Ibid.
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minority women than the rhetoric of an all encompassing and overarching Uniform Civil
Code”.85 A UCC, she further argues, “would inadvertently situate minority women in an
antagonistic relationship against their own communities, and hence may not receive the
support of women from these communities”.86 These scholars tend to dismiss the one-size-
fits-all approach promised by “universal” human rights and favour “a more nuanced and
culture specific theory of women’s rights” and “a position which is rooted within Third
World realities”.87 This focus on the idea of the intersection of gender and religion88 fits
within studies showing that “Third World women” often avoid demanding “radical social
restructuring in order to achieve feminist goals” and instead “tend to opt for gradual
changes that result from their collaboration with their male counterparts to enhance
their communal influence vis-à-vis other members and improve living standards of their
families and of the community itself”.89
The discourse around top-down or bottom-up reform approaches, that has just been
described for feminist scholarship, resonates with a debate that took place among the
Indian women’s movement and which has been described by scholars in the women’s
and gender studies. It is interesting to see that the Indian women’s movement has
undergone a significant shift in its position vis-à-vis a UCC – the “hydra-headed
monster” that “raises its head every now and again and then only to be lopped off or
buried”.90 While in the late 1970s and early 1980s, women’s rights activists took a strong
position in advocating a UCC, this position began to come under critique from the mid-
1980s and early 1990s onwards when slowly but steadily most women’s groups began to
prefer small-scale reforms from within the religious communities over large-scale state-
led reforms.91 This shift was largely seen in connection to a growing “communalization”
of the topic after the Shah Bano case and other events.92 Murthy and Dasgupta point out
that “[l]ike Shah Bano, other Muslim women began to be torn between their religious
beliefs, community affiliations and gender rights”.93 With the communal politics of the
time and the nationwide riots following the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992,
“women’s groups were forced to rethink their strategy on demands for a UCC”.94
The women’s movement’s legal activism
Scholarship has also addressed the fact that both the Indian state as well as the religious
communities are unlikely to act out of their own impulse. Rather, it is often feminist
activists and women’s rights groups who initiate reform processes. Mary E John in her
Reader on women’s studies, for instance, stresses, “No-one would contest that the law
85Flavia Agnes, ‘Minority Identity and Gender Concerns’ (2001) 36 Economic and Political Weekly 3973. Similarly, see
also Anika Rahman, ‘Religious Rights versus Women’s Rights in India: A Test Case for International Human Rights Law’
(1990) 28 Columbia Journal for Transnational Law 473.
86Agnes, Family Law Volume I (n 23) xxvii.
87Ibid xxviii.
88Menon, Seeing Like a Feminist (n 22) 157.
89Ranjoo Seodu Herr, ‘Reclaiming Third World Feminism: Or Why Transnational Feminism Needs Third World Feminism’
(2014) 12 Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism 1, 5.
90Gandhi and Shah (n 13) 252.
91Mary E John (ed), Women’s Studies in India: A Reader (Penguin Books 2008) 494; Narain (n 23) 148.
92Mullally (n 23) 673; John (n 91) 494; Narain (n 23) 148; Flavia Agnes, ‘From Shah Bano to Kausar Bano: Contextualizing
the “Muslim Woman” within a Communalized Polity’ in Ania Loomba and Ritty A Lukose (eds), South Asian Feminisms
(Duke University Press 2012) 35; Murthy and Dasgupta (n 62) 128.
93Murthy and Dasgupta (n 62) 127.
94Ibid 128.
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has been a privileged site of struggle and debate in the contemporary women’s
movement”.95 Other scholars have stressed the importance of “legal activism” in a
similar fashion. For instance, Mala Khullar’s Writing the Women’s Movement96 ded-
icates one section to the topic of women and the law. Here, the editor brings together a
number of somewhat older but influential pieces of feminist scholarship addressing
“legal frameworks”,97 “constitutional guarantees”,98 broader questions of “law and
gender inequality”,99 the concept of “human rights lawyering”100 or the law as a
“subversive site”.101 Ratna Kapur’s contribution in this volume puts the contemporary
women’s movement in a historical context by comparing how the social reform move-
ment in the nineteenth century, women in India’s independence movement and con-
temporary activists engaged with the law.102 She states that social reformers who sought
to do away with “barbaric” and “backward” practices such as sati and child marriage
largely drew on “protective legislation for women” while maintaining the “construction
of women’s identities as wives and mothers within the familial sphere”.103 Women in
the independence movement began to demand formal equality for women.104 And the
contemporary women’s movement structured its activism around the concept of patri-
archy and sought to identify and understand women’s subordination and oppression.105
Legal activism also features – although to a lesser extent – in some of the contribu-
tions in Ritu Menon’s106 selection of very personal memoirs of the movement’s
protagonists. In her introduction, Menon reminds the reader that it was often specific
events, campaigns and actions by the women’s movement that set the grand debates
about law and religion into motion.107 For instance, when in 1983 Shahnaz Sheikh filed
a petition challenging Muslim personal law in the Supreme Court, arguing that it
violated her fundamental right to equality, a “Pandora’s box” was opened up and
oppositional rights claims regarding the freedom of religion, the prohibition of dis-
crimination, community rights and the individual’s rights to privacy were debated
forcefully.108 Some of the contributions in this volume, such as that of Indira
Jaising,109 or the women’s organization Saheli110 address the movement’s legal cam-
paigns or their opposition towards religious norms and customs more specifically.
95John (n 91) 263.
96Mala Khullar (ed), Writing the Women’s Movement: A Reader (Zubaan 2005).
97Mala Khullar, ‘Legal Frameworks’ in Mala Khullar (ed), Writing the Women’s Movement: A Reader (Zubaan 2005).
98Lotika Sarkar, ‘Constitutional Guarantees: The Unequal Sex’ in Mala Khullar (ed), Writing the Women’s Movement: A
Reader (Zubaan 2005).
99Flavia Agnes, ‘Law and Gender Inequality: The Politics of Women’s Rights in India’ in Mala Khullar (ed), Writing the
Women’s Movement: A Reader (Zubaan 2005).
100Nandita Haksar, ‘Human Rights Lawyering: A Feminist Perspective’ in Mala Khullar (ed), Writing the Women’s
Movement: A Reader (Zubaan 2005).
101Ratna Kapur, ‘Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with the Law in India’ in Mala Khullar (ed), Writing the
Women’s Movement: A Reader (Zubaan 2005).
102Ibid.
103Ibid 157.
104Ibid.
105Ibid.
106Ritu Menon (ed), Making a Difference: Memoirs from the Women’s Movement in India (Women Unlimited 2011).
107Ritu Menon, ‘Introduction’ in Ritu Menon (ed), Making a Difference: Memoirs from the Women’s Movement in India
(Women Unlimited 2011) xvi.
108Ibid.
109Indira Jaising, ‘An Outsider, Inside’ in Ritu Menon (ed), Making a Difference: Memoirs from the Women’s Movement in
India (Women Unlimited 2011).
110Saheli, ‘Against the Odds, and often, Against the Grain’ in Ritu Menon (ed), Making a Difference: Memoirs from the
Women’s Movement in India (Women Unlimited 2011).
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A number of studies deal specifically with Muslim women’s activism. Muslim women’s
groups formed as a reaction to the perceived Hindu-bias111 within the early Indian
women’s movement and also as part of the reverberation of the Shah Bano case.
Authors like Vatuk,112 Schneider113 or Tschalaer114 regard these groups as part of, and
influenced by a transnational discourse of Islamic feminism, which argues that the Quran
guarantees Muslim women a number of rights that in practice are routinely denied to
them due to patriarchal interpretations of Islamic law. At the same time, many of these
Muslim women’s organizations “remain firmly rooted in local grass-roots initiatives and
they also regard themselves as an integral part of the national women’s movement”.115
Tschalaer116 looks at Muslim women’s rights activism in India by using the stories of
three women’s activists in the city of Lucknow and their respective women’s organiza-
tions: the reformist All India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board, the secular
Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan and the rather conservative Bazme Khawateen.
While none of these organizations would identify as explicitly feminist, their work
can nevertheless be seen as part of the global phenomenon of “Islamic feminism”,
described earlier. Tschalaer depicts the activists’ attempts to foster Muslim women’s
visibility within the public sphere, to lobby the state to secure the rights of Muslim
women and to draft gender-just Islamic marriage contracts (nikahnamas). She shows
that the activists regularly transgress boundaries by challenging “the authority of the
orthodox clergy” and their “hegemonic ideas on gender”,117 but that they also find
themselves in situations where they have to “bargain with patriarchy”, meaning that
they conform to patriarchal ideas of women’s modesty and purity in order to secure
their own legitimacy.118 To Tschalaer, the women’s rights activists function as what
Sally Engle Merry has termed “knowledge brokers”.119 Being “fluent in a variety of legal
languages” – Islamic laws, state-governed Muslim personal law, constitutional rights,
criminal law and international human rights law – their role is to “translate” and form a
bridge between these different legal worlds.120 The Quran and the Indian Constitution
are thereby not perceived as opposites, but rather in terms of their synergies.
Forum shopping and navigating plurilegal orders
Scholarship also engages with the individual women that live under the personal law
systems and shows how they manoeuvre through the plurilegal system, using state law
as well as “do-it-yourself law” to make their claims.121
111Flavia Agnes, ‘Redefining the Agenda of the Women’s Movement within a Secular Framework’ in Tanika Sarkar and
Urvashi Butalia (eds), Women and Right-Wing Movements: Indian Experiences (Zed Books 1995) 138; Kumar (n 13) 106.
112Sylvia Vatuk, ‘Islamic Feminism in India: Indian Muslim Women Activists and the Reform of Muslim Personal Law’
(2008) 42 Modern Asian Studies 489.
113Nadja-Christina Schneider, ‘Islamic Feminism and Muslim Women’s Rights Activism in India: From Transnational
Discourse to Local Movement – Or Vice Versa?’ (2009) 11 Journal of International Women’s Studies 56.
114Tschalaer (n 7).
115Schneider (n 113) 64.
116Tschalaer (n 7).
117Ibid 97.
118Ibid 86. The terminology “bargaining with patriarchy” is borrowed here from Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘Bargaining with
Patriarchy’ in Judith Lorber and Susann A Farrell (eds), The Social Construction of Gender (Sage 1991).
119Tschalaer (n 7), referring to Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’
(2006) 108 American Anthropologist 38.
120Tschalaer (n 7) 169.
121Basu (n 12) 9.
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Gopika Solanki, as pointed out earlier, speaks about a model of “shared adjudication” in
this regard.122 This model, she argues, is linked to two simultaneous trends: the centraliza-
tion of law (the codification of customs and policy making through legal precedents) and
the decentralization of law (the fragmentation of law as there is no coherence in judge-
ments). Her study on the adjudication of Hindu and Muslim marriage and divorce law in
the city of Mumbai argues that gender equality is not necessarily brought about through
more centralization. Instead, it is advanced through the (inter)action of various players and
women’s possibility to “forum shop”, i.e. to choose between a variety of state and substate
dispute resolutionmechanisms: courts, women’s organizations, social workers, panchayats,
religious institutions, family members or local “strongmen”.123 By providing many options
to choose from, argues Solanki (in contrast to much of the feminist legal scholarship
depicted earlier), legal pluralism can actually ensure gender equality.124 In a similar fashion,
Tschalaer argues that Muslim women litigants in Lucknow may make strategic use of the
different dispute resolution mechanisms “so as to maximise their chances for justice”.125 In
addition, Tschalaer also sees an important function of the different fora in that they provide
a site where women “have the authority to speak and to narrate their experiences”.126
Srimati Basu seems to be a little more sceptical of this argument. She argues, instead,
that the coexistence of multiple (quasi-) legal options is not necessarily an advantage for
women. But having different possibilities for pursuing grievances also means that women
must navigate between difficult choices and sometimes contradictory directives.127
Setting up one’s own system: women’s courts
Another way of evading the disadvantages of the systems currently in place, are the so-
called “women’s courts” (mahila adalat or mahila mandal). These are dispute-resolution
fora run by government bodies or voluntary organizations that are designed to address
women’s marital and related family problems.128 They aim to provide a safe and unthrea-
tening environment in which women can air their grievances, work out satisfactory
settlements with their husbands and in-laws or find ways to escape their difficult situations
altogether. As shown by Basu with regard to the family court, Vatuk, however, also states
that the primary goal of the women running these courts is to “reconcile” couples.129 This
commitment to the goal of keeping marriages intact leads Vatuk to ask “to what extent
woman-only courts are able to live up in practice to the feminist principles of the NGOs
that are responsible for having set them up in the first place”.130 On the other hand, for
Vatuk one of the most positive features of these courts is that “peer mediators are able to
suggest solutions based on the realities of the women’s lives, taking into account the social
and cultural context in which they live”.131
122Solanki (n 4).
123Ibid.
124Ibid.
125Tschalaer (n 7) 190.
126Ibid 159.
127Basu (n 12) 183.
128Sylvia Vatuk, ‘The “Women’s Court” in India: An Alternative Dispute Resolution Body for Women in Distress’ (2013) 45
The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 76.
129Ibid 95.
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131Ibid 97.
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In a similar fashion, Tschalaer also draws a mixed picture of the dispute settlement
mechanisms that some Muslim women’s organizations in Lucknow offer. While these
fora are certainly less paternalistic than the darul qazas, their effectiveness finds its
limits in the societal context: Knowing that divorce leaves many women destitute and
publicly shamed, the activists frequently encourage their litigants to seek reconciliation
and give their marriage “one more chance”.132
Conclusion
The fact that the personal law system is problematic from a gendered perspective is not
news. During the last decades, feminist scholarship has succeeded in largely influencing
the mainstream discourse in this regard and has made people more gender sensitive when
thinking about law and religion. At the same time, the literature presented here shows
that neither can the problems easily be pinned down to one specific aspect nor are there
easy solutions to the conflicts that arise in this area. Personal laws remain a highly
contested topic and different interests and identities play out in the debate around them.
One aspect that falls rather short in the literature – especially when compared with
the scholarship in other countries – is that of feminist litigation in the area of personal
laws. As pointed out earlier, the Shayara Bano case was not only initiated by a number
of Muslim women who attempted to bring about a landmark decision, but it was also
supported by a number of women’s rights groups who, with this case reinitiated a
broader debate about personal laws and gender (in)equality. Thereby, the case stands in
a line of other cases, where bold women (including Shah Bano, Mary Roy and many
others) or activist lawyers such as Indira Jaising or Flavia Agnes have used the courts as
vehicles for social change – a phenomenon that in the Canadian and US-American
literature is largely studied under the key words of “strategic litigation”, “cause lawyer-
ing”, “feminist lawyering” or “women’s rights litigation”.133 In India, scholarship has
indeed engaged extensively with activist judges and Public Interest Litigation (PIL).
However, few projects have studied those activists or lawyers that actually bring the
cases before the courts.134 And there is indeed a lack of literature when it comes to
feminist litigation vis-à-vis the personal law system.
Some of the aforementioned scholars touch upon the issue briefly. Serajuddin focuses
on judicial activism and evaluates as to how far judges make law in the area of Muslim
personal law, rather than just interpreting it,135 but he doesn’t actually engage with the
question of who brings the cases before the courts in the first place. Subramanian points
132Tschalaer (n 7) 163.
133Particularly on the impact of women’s rights activists on courts, see Karen O’Connor and Lee Epstein, ‘Beyond
Legislative Lobbying: Women’s Rights Groups and the Supreme Court’ (1983) 67 Judicature 134; Tracy E George and
Lee Epstein, ‘Women’s Rights Litigation in the 1980s: More of the Same’ (1990–1991) 74 Judicature 314; FL Morton
and Avril Allen, ‘Feminists and the Courts: Measuring Success in Interest Group Litigation in Canada’ (2001) 34
Canadian Journal of Political Science 55; Christopher P Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court: Legal
Mobilization and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (UBC Press 2004); Holly J McCammon and Allison R
McGrath, ‘Litigating Change? Social Movements and the Court System’ (2015) 9 Sociology Compass 128.
134See, however, the studies by Arvind Narrain and Arun Thiruvengadam, ‘Social Justice Lawyering and the Meaning of
Indian Constitutionalism: A Case Study of the Alternative Law Forum’ (2014) 31 Wisconsin International Law Journal
525; Avani Mehta Sood, ‘Gender Justice through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies from India’ (2008) 41
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 833. Sood argues that “the PIL vehicle has great potential for advancing
gender justice” if used strategically by women’s rights advocates and promoted by the courts.
135Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, Muslim Family Law and Cases on Muslim Law (n 20).
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out that landmark court decisions were often initiated or supported by civil society
organizations and women’s groups.136 He writes: “The growth in civil society mobiliza-
tion, the increased attention of rights organizations to litigation and legal policy, and the
experience of the emergency led certain judges in the higher courts to support the rights
of weaker groups sporadically”.137 According to Subramanian, it was the minority com-
munities in particular that were active in pushing for reform through case law: Muslim
women challenged the validity of talaq, the economic consequences of divorce or the
validity of polygamy138 and Christian women litigated the conditions under which
divorce would be accessible and the possibilities of adoption.139 Whether and under
what conditions Indian women’s groups who pursue litigation are successful on a large
scale would be an interesting field of research to delve into.
It would also be interesting to investigate whether the Supreme Court has entered a
new era of personal law jurisprudence in the wake of the Shayara Bano case. With the
Court’s rather clear stance in the triple talaq judgement, the aforementioned critique of
the Supreme Court practising a “hands off”-approach might not be entirely accurate
anymore. At the same time, even within this landmark judgement, the gender aspect fell
rather short.140 Although Articles 14 and 15 did feature, the judgement did not engage
with the intersectionality of gender and religious identity and ultimately the Court
seemed less concerned with women’s rights, but rather with the preservation of marriage,
when it found fault with triple talaq on the basis that “the marital tie can be broken
capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so
as to save it”.141 Feminist legal scholarship that critically assesses the Indian jurisprudence
and points to its shortcomings thus stays as important as it always was.
Shayara Bano has also produced a new discourse on law reform. This has its positive
aspects when it produces attempts to critically revaluate those laws that discriminate
against women or draw on patriarchal and paternalistic understandings. After the
judgement, the Indian blogosphere produced a large amount of articles that used the
Shayara Bano case as a starting point to think critically about other legal areas, such as
other personal laws142 or the Indian rape law.143 However, the judgement has also
provoked some highly alarming developments when Hindu nationalists and the poli-
tical right now attempt to criminalize the pronouncement of talaq with imprisonment.
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go’ The Wire (28 August 2017) <https://thewire.in/171451/personal-law-reform-gender/> accessed 16 February 2018;
Narendra Subramanian, ‘Beyond triple talaq, India needs a debate on how to reform Muslim, Hindu law’ The Wire
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That arguments of gender equality are misused in order to fuel anti-Muslim sentiments
is a worrying phenomenon that we do not only see in India but also in Europe.144
Scholarship that delves into this phenomenon is much needed.
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